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Abstract 
Analysing how the SSR process in CAR has been defined and then implemented, this article puts 
emphasis on the international interactions between institutional actors who may be 
geographically/territorially situated at different levels of the policy-making process in different places 
around the world, thus suggesting ways to grasp multi-actor and multi-sited governance. Therefore, it 
advocates an approach which consists of expanding the agenda of the traditional multi-level 
governance approach. The issue at stake here is to capture the interactive institutional dynamic at an 
international level, thus developing a methodological framework that is likely to seize both the top-
down and the bottom-up dynamics of decision-making processes. The first objective is to capture the 
sets of actors and procedures which drive the process, and to map out the various levels of government 
at which decisions are made, either the more top-down, or the more bottom-up oriented ones, 
answering two sets of questions: How is security governance organised? Who decides, and on which 
matters? Secondly – and more fundamentally – is to capture the intermingling of domestic and 
international decision-making processes which increasingly overlap and interfere with each other in 
Southern countries. 
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In 2008, under international pressure, the Central African Republic government accepted the challenge 
to engage in a holistic and comprehensive security sector reform (SSR) process. This SSR process was 
launched during a national seminar whose conclusions were officially endorsed by President Bozizé.
2 
To oversee the SSR process, a twofold co-ordination structure has been set up that consists of: 
1.  a national committee, headed by the Deputy Minister of Defence, which brings together 
representatives from each ministry that deals with security and justice matters; 
2.  an international committee, which is in charge of co-ordinating financial and technical 
assistance and is made of international partners, namely, the European Union (EU), the UNDP 
and France (see appendix). 
This co-ordination structure aims at harmonising the action between the different levels of decision-
making, and can be seen as a formalised “forum” that is meant to deal with the complexity of 
governance (Benz and Papadopoulous, 2006). Security governance in the Central African Republic 
(CAR) involves a wide range of institutional actors with competing agendas and objectives. Both 
national and international stakeholders are involved in the management of the security sector which, 
consequently, must be seen as governed increasingly on multi-levels. 
Probing the decision-making processes at stake in security sector reform is particularly important 
since security policy is traditionally seen as the preserve of sovereign states. One could argue that the 
Central African State has never been sovereign in the area of security, due to France’s historical 
influence in its security policy after independence. However, the phenomenon that is presently at stake 
is much more than a simple post-colonial bilateral relationship. 
This article aims to investigate the governance of the security sector in the CAR by using the lens 
of the multi-level governance approach (MLG), which offers a relevant framework in which to 
investigate the inter-institutional processes, particularly to hijack the formal arrangements 
(administrative procedures and legal framework), as well as the informal dynamics (social network 
ties, ideas and beliefs) which do have an effect on policy-making. One way to get a better 
understanding of the international movement of ideas and practices is to deepen and widen the concept 
of multi-level governance – which is usually utilised almost exclusively to study EU policies – in 
order to grasp policy-making processes in a non-EU context (Central Africa) that is characterised by 
its own governance specificities. 
Analysing how the SSR process in the CAR has been defined and then implemented, this article 
puts emphasis on the international interactions between institutional actors who may be 
geographically/territorially situated at different levels of the policy-making process in different places 
around the world, thus suggesting ways to grasp multi-actor and multi-sited governance. Therefore, it 
advocates an approach which consists of expanding the agenda of the traditional multi-level 
governance approach. The issue at stake here is to capture the interactive institutional dynamic at an 
international level, thus developing a methodological framework that is likely to seize both the top-
down and the bottom-up dynamics of decision-making processes. In addition to theory development 
around the concept of multi-level governance, this article aims to contribute more broadly to the 
knowledge and understanding of security policy-making in Southern countries. 
                                                      
*  Paper prepared for the Workshop on “Transforming Political Structures: Security, Institutions, and Regional Integration 
Mechanisms”, organised by the European Report of Development in Florence, Italy, 16-17 April 2009. 
1  The author wants to thank Dr. Yves-Alexandre Chouala and Prof. Michael Barnett for their invaluable comments. 
2  Crucial steps: Security Sector Reform in CAR, report published with the support of the UNDP, 
http://hdptcar.net/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/undp_ssr_report_may_2008.pdf. Niagalé Bagayoko-Penone 
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Analysing multi-level security governance requires the adoption of an approach that is likely to 
identify where power is located, taking into account the inter-institutional relationships and the 
governance arrangements in the particular social context of the CAR. The first objective is to capture 
the sets of actors and procedures which drive the process, and to map out the various levels of 
government at which decisions are made, either the more top-down, or the more bottom-up oriented 
ones, answering two sets of questions: How is security governance organised? Who decides, and on 
which matters? Secondly – and more fundamentally – is to capture the intermingling of domestic and 
international decision-making processes which increasingly overlap and interfere with each other in 
Southern countries. 
First of all, this paper will present the theoretical framework based upon a multi-governance 
approach. Then, it will analyse the decision-making processes that are specifically at stake in the 
formulation and implementation of the SSR process in the CAR, focusing on the interactions between 
the international actors, on the one hand (both bilateral and multilateral), and the national stakeholders, 
on the other. 
2. Expanding the multi-level governance approach beyond the analysis of the EU  
In recent years, a multi-level governance approach has become increasingly fashionable amongst 
scholars who study the European Union (EU). Research based upon a multi-level governance 
approaches mainly deal with the complexity of decision-making processes within the EU itself, 
focusing on the relationships between a wide range of European institutional actors, at supranational, 
national and sub-national levels
3. Recently, the multi-governance approach has been expanded to 
emphasise the role of the actors involved in EU foreign policy, and the way in which they interact with 
each other. According to Michael Smith: 
“governance can be broadly defined as the authority to make, implement and enforce rules in a 
specified policy domain.
4 Multi-level governance refers to the sharing of this authority across an 
institutionalised, hierarchically structured set of actors with varying degrees of unity/coherence, 
commitment to EU norms and power resources.” 
Yet, most of the research that uses a multi-level governance approach, including those studying the 
foreign policy of the EU, is primarily focused on the decision-making processes in EU circles, which 
involve the institutional actors of the CFSP/ESDP (Communautarian and European Council actors on 
the one hand, and national constituencies within the Member States on the other). Whilst this is very 
relevant to the capturing of the power configuration and decision-making processes that shape EU 
foreign policy at European level, this multi-governance approach has too often only addressed one 
side of the question. Put another way, most of the multi-level governance streams of research do not 
take into consideration the fact that governance is “internationally multi-sited”, and that local partners 
have to be integrated into the analysis: the multi-level governance approach to EU foreign policy is 
focused mainly on the formulation phase of the CFSP/ESDP. 
Regrettably, the MLG approach has been little used in the study of the relationships between the 
EU’s institutional actors and their non-European partners (i.e., out of EU territory and jurisdiction) on 
the one hand, and, more importantly, in the study of governance in other regions or other polities, on 
                                                      
3  For a critical overview of the literature dealing with a governance approach to European Integration, see Jachtenfuchs, 
2001) 
4  The multi-governance approach is related to the “actor-centred institutionalist approach to policy research” proposed by 
Scharpf (1997) – and derived from the study of political-organisational fields. Scharpf’s
’ approach focuses on the “policy 
domain concept” whose basic idea is that “the solutions to a given policy problem must be produced by the 
interdependent choices of a plurality of policy actors with specific capabilities and with specific perceptions and 
preferences regarding the outcomes that could be obtained”. Multi-level Governance and Security: The Security Sector Reform Process in the Central African Republic 
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the other. Yet, the MLG approach can offer a relevant framework in which to study governance in 
Southern-countries. 
2.1. Identifying the distribution of power 
Although stimulating as an overriding framework, the multi-level governance concept’s explanatory 
powers are not self-evident. A number of authors have criticised MLG for standing purely as a 
“compelling description of changing process of public policy-making”. Recently, Ian Bache (2008) has 
made an attempt to address the multi-level governance approach’s silence with regard to the issue of 
the distribution and exercise of power. As he states, “multi-level governance is an intuitively appealing 
concept that offers some insights and informs a research agenda. (…) There is a need for empirical 
research on multi-level governance that adopts a more critical stance on the issue of power” and is 
informed by the following requirements: 
1.  firstly, a clear explanation of its assumptions in relation to the nature and location of power. 
“There is a need to explicitly theorise how actors’ power is structured (generally unequally) 
within governance arrangements”. According to Bache, a good starting point is to situate MLG in 
relation to three aspects of the power and policy-making debate: 1. decision-making; 2. agenda-
setting; and 3. preference-shaping; 
2.  secondly, clearer empirical benchmarks for what does and what does not constitute multi-level 
governance. If a growing number of actors are involved in policy-making, the question is to 
determine whether this changes the outcomes. “Presumably, governance should signal more 
dispersed influence over outcomes”, as stated by Bache. Consequently, there is a need to specify 
empirically when participation becomes meaningful, that is, whether different participants actually 
do influence outcomes, and when multi-level governance arrangements demonstrate a dispersal of 
power. The resources dependence framework can help here. “Governance networks are made up 
of resources-dependent organisations: it is why they interact. Key resources are: financial, 
informational, political, organisational and constitutional-legal. Understanding the distribution of 
these resources and the skills with which actors use them is key to explaining policy-decisions and 
outcomes-implementation matters. These tools allow us to sharpen our understanding of whether 
what we are investigating is a substantive or superficial change in power over decision-making 
and outcomes. High interdependence equals dispersed power”; 
3.  thirdly, explicit theorising of the relationships between actors, governance arrangements and social 
context. “The social context in which governance arrangements exist largely explains the 
distribution of resources between actors. (…) There is a further structuring of actors resources by 
the nature of the particular governance arrangements (for example, formal rules, rules of the 
games, type of network). Beyond this distribution of resources, policy decisions (and outcomes) 
are shaped by the skills with which actors employ the resources available to them (agency). Social 
constructivism brings to MLG research a focus on the social characteristics of agents to highlight 
their cultural, economic, social and symbolic capital. There is a need to go beyond first face of 
power to investigating less tangible forms of power by relating governance dynamics to the 
context. (…) Members with particular social and/or functional backgrounds [are] able to dominate 
decision-making in the process of MLG”. Elsewhere, Bache states that “MLG research tends to 
focus on observable decision-making: [this is] an important part of the puzzle, but leaves it open to 
the charge that it does not account for the different capacities between actors (often concealed), 
that is key to understanding the nature and impact of the decisions made”. 
2.2 Bringing into the analysis the “policy transfer approach” 
As mentioned above, most scholars who refer to the multi-level governance approach have left out the 
question of the impact that national partners do have on the ground on the policies supported by 
international stakeholders. In fact, in order to integrate into the analysis the role of the national Niagalé Bagayoko-Penone 
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partners, the multi-level governance approach has to be deepened and enriched with the burgeoning 
literature on “policy transfer approach”. 
Developing a research agenda on multi-level governance in Central and Eastern Europe, Paul 
Stubbs (2005) has addressed the “missed opportunity”, which characterises most of the research based 
upon a multi-governance approach by proposing to bring into the analysis the challenging perspectives 
which can be provided by political sociology, political anthropology and political economy. With 
reference to Bache and Flinders (2004), Paul Stubbs’ research on the EU policy in Central and Eastern 
Europe highlights the need to conceptualise and understand decision-making processes “in terms of 
complex overlapping networks”. Stubbs’ research focuses on “the way the multi-level governance 
concept allows for an understanding of the transformation of the role of the state towards new 
strategies of coordination, steering and networking”. When placing the stress “on the ways in which 
traditional notions of democratic accountability are being undermined and challenged”, Stubbs relates 
the crisis of accountability to the development of multi-level governance. To do so, he refers to the 
“policy transfer” approach, defined by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) as “the process by which 
knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system 
(past or present) is used in the development of policies, arrangements, institutions and ideas in 
another political system”. The aim of this research agenda is to capture the impact of foreign 
institutions as the source of policy ideas, policy design as well as implementation in developmental 
countries, and enrich the grasp of politics, policies and practices. More importantly, Stubbs explains 
that “the multi-dimensional, confusing and contradictory nature of policy transfers can be understood 
in terms of the ways in which codified knowledge, seen as globally applicable, and working through 
standards, techniques and “best practices”, becomes tacit knowledge through a series of 
interpretative encounters”. Finally, Stubbs highlights the importance of taking into account the 
dimensions of “policy resistance” and “resistance strategies of apparently weak groups in the context 
of asymmetric dependencies”, using contributions from anthropology (Bache and Taylor) and referring 
to James C. Scott (1987; 1992), which focuses on the different strategies of internal actors not only in 
terms of immediate interests, but also with respect to the profound importance of historical legacies, 
experience and contexts
5. These perspectives of Stubbs’ advocate an understanding of how 
international decision-making processes (in his case study, the EU decision-making processes) interact 
with formal and informal channels of decision at national level in partner countries. His interest is not 
just on formal decision-making processes, but also on semi-formal and informal ones. 
2.3 Methodology 
Following the frameworks suggested by Ian Bache and Paul Stubbs, this paper suggests an analysis of 
the security governance arrangements aiming at capturing the distribution of power in the social 
context of the CAR, by analysing the kinds of resources that are mobilised by different set of actors 
(national and international) at every stage of the decision-making process. 
To capture multi-level, multi-sited governance, there is a need to focus both on the formulation 
phase (agenda-setting and programming phase) and the implementation phase of policy-making 
(managing and monitoring)
6. Indeed, security governance in the CAR involves a wide range of 
domestic actors (national authorities as well as non-governmental and non-state actors) and 
international stakeholders (international organisations as well as other states) which intervene along 
with specific policy-making processes (both formal and informal), which themselves interact and 
interfere with each other. Consequently, security governance in the CAR is shaped by inter-
                                                      
5  Focusing on the interface between donors and recipients, Janine Wedel (2004) has developed a similar approach. She 
addresses the interactions between multiplex networks where actors interact in a variety of capacities, with multiple 
identities. 
6  Gary Marks (1993) has taken into account both of these phases when analysing European integration in his first 
conceptualisation of multi-level governance. Multi-level Governance and Security: The Security Sector Reform Process in the Central African Republic 
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institutional power relations, and the outcomes of this policy result, to a large extent, from the 
interactions between the international and national resources mobilised during the policy-making 
processes. As stated by Jeanie Bukowski (2001): 
“unlike neo-realist analyses, the multi-level governance view dictates the consideration of all 
actors involved in the various stages of policy-making. The rationale here is that, in reality, those 
people and groups in charge of carrying out a policy have as much or more influence over its 
actual impact as those who initiate and legislate the policy. Moreover, the “formulators” and 
“implementers” may or may not be the same actors.” 
Consequently, we propose to capture power distribution in security governance by identifying the kind 
of resources (both material and normative) that are mobilised by each set of actors that have been 
involved in security governance in the CAR since the launching of the SSR process, namely the EU
7, 
France and national stakeholders (both governmental and non-governmental) at the following stages of 
the policy-making process: 
1.  policy formulation phase (agenda-setting and programming); 
2.  Implementing phase (managing and monitoring). 
3. Policy formulation phase: agenda-setting and programming  
To identify the distribution of power during the agenda-setting/programming phases, there is a need to 
identify who has been providing the guidelines, setting the priorities and defining the general purpose 
of the process meant to reform the security sector in the CAR, and then identify who has been 
involved in programming the different stages of the process. Throughout this policy formulation 
phase, three kinds of resources have been primarily mobilised: the normative resources, the 
assessment resources, and the programmatic resources. 
3.1 Normative resources 
Studying the normative resources enables one to capture the representation of security that underlies 
the approach of each set of stakeholders. This paragraph therefore emphasises the representation of 
security in a context marked by a plurality of actors with different objectives, strategies and 
expectations. 
3.2 Multilateral stakeholders 
The EU is the most important international stakeholder that supports the SSR process in the CAR. The 
European approach to SSR is one of the most operational applications of the multi-functional approach 
promoted at the strategic level by the European Security Strategy, which highlights the holistic 
approach of the EU foreign policy, in which security, economic development and democracy are seen 
as essential contributions to the generation of political stability in the EU’s international environment. 
In addition to anti-terrorism and disarmament missions, the European Security Strategy has identified 
support to SSR in partner countries as a new EU field of intervention, thus contributing both to 
enlarging the initial spectrum of the Petersburg Tasks,
8 and to the inclusion of security missions in the 
framework of Community policies. Consequently, the EU SSR policy is rooted in two different policy 
                                                      
7  It is important here to mention the fact that the UNDP is also a major stakeholder in the SSR process in the CAR. 
However, due to the focus of the ERD Conference, this article does not address its role in detail, and specifically focuses 
on the EU’s role. 
8  SSR is also mentioned in several other papers such as: Council conclusions on security and development (2007), EU 
concept for crisis management missions in the field of civilian administration (2003), The European consensus on 
development (2006), The Commission communication on governance and development (2003). Niagalé Bagayoko-Penone 
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frameworks:
9 first, the ESDP under Pillar 2; second, Community policy under Pillar 1.
10 The EU’s 
support of the SSR process in the CAR process is exclusively a Community-driven policy which 
provides a good example of the policy-making processes at stake in a foreign policy led outside the 
framework of the second Pillar.
11 
The EC (as well as the ESDP) SSR documents explicitly refer to the SSR guidelines (“Security 
System reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice”) adopted by the OECD/DAC and 
translated into political and operational principles in the “OECD Handbook on Security Systems 
Reform: Supporting Security and Justice”. The SSR process supported in the CAR by the EU appears 
as an ideal-type illustration of the holistic approach developed by the OECD/DAC, according to 
which, security sector reform (SSR) consequently seeks to increase its partner countries’ ability to 
meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms 
and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law. SSR not only includes, but 
extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security  assistance on defence, 
intelligence and policing. Consequently, the EC support to SSR in the CAR specifically focuses on: 
democratic governance of the armed forces (including transparency and accountability in budgeting 
processes); judiciary institutions; institutions responsible for enforcing the law, especially the police 
forces; supervision and oversight institutions, particularly the Parliament, the media and civil society; 
DDR processes; and integration of SSR-related programmes in the peace and security agendas of REC 
(Regional Economic Communities), such as ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African 
States). 
The overall objective of the OECD approach is to introduce a rationalisation in the organisation of 
the security apparatus, and to promote democratic oversight and supervision mechanisms. It is 
important here to note that the SSR concept itself, as framed by the OECD, promotes a multi-level 
approach of security governance. As stated by the OECD/DAC Manual, the overarching objective of 
SSR processes is to introduce a system of “multi-layered security governance”, which promotes a 
democratic accountability at multiple levels of oversight:  
“A multi-layered approach to justice and security divides international assistance between: the 
state, at its various levels, as one of many providers of justice and security service delivery; the 
state, in its role of regulator to establish the parameters for justice and security service delivery and 
ensure accountability of providers; non-state justice and security providers, given their position as 
primary purveyors of day-to-day service delivery; the users and recipients, state an non-state, of 
justice and security services, to increase their voice and hold providers accountable (…) In many 
                                                      
9  For an overview of the EU SSR approach, see Babaud (2008) & Bagayoko (2008). 
10  There are two documents that define the role of the EU in the field of SRR: The “EU concept for ESDP Support to 
Security Sector Reform”, draft in October 2005 by the General Secretariat of the Council, in accordance with a PSC’s 
(Political and Security Committee) tasking (EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform; Council of the 
European Union, 13/10/05, Brussels. 
The May 2006 ”Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform”, which provides a framework for 
the EC support to SSR. A third document - “Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform; 
General Affairs Council meeting, 12/06/06, Luxembourg – is meant to synthesise the ESDP and the EC SSR Concepts. 
11  The support provided by the European Commission to the SSR process in the CAR gives a sense of the major role that 
the EC in EU foreign policy can play. Whilst most of the time the foreign and security policy of the EU is seen as 
exclusively referring to the second pillar – and consequently to the role of the Member States and of the General 
Secretariat of the Council – the EU SSR policy sheds light on the key influence of the European Commission. Because 
the EC institutional actors are major stakeholders, the EU SSR policy proves how the first conceptualisation of multi-
governance - which is used to concentrate on the central role of the European Community institutions in the integration 
process (Marks G. 1993; Marks Hooghe and Marks,1999) - remains topical and relevant. Furthermore, the EU SSR 
policy also demonstrates the validity of Michael Smith’s approach (2004, 2006) which, as mentioned above, has recently 
expanded the multi-level governance approach to studying EU foreign policy by stating that “the TEU provides a greater 
degree of autonomy for EC organisational actors in European foreign policy during specific phases of policy process”. 
The EU support to SSR-related programmes confirms that the Commission can have a determining influence over the 
implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Multi-level Governance and Security: The Security Sector Reform Process in the Central African Republic 
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developing and fragile states, the design of justice and security development indeed requires a 
multi-layered approach that provides assistance to a range of legitimate state and non-state 
providers at the multiple points at which actual day-to-day service delivery occurs. (…) The 
objective is to make the delivery of justice and security services more accessible, effective, 
accountable and rights respecting.”
12 
Five inter-dependent pillars of oversight and control are thus defined: internal control; executive 
control; parliamentary oversight; judicial review; and civil society oversight. 
Furthermore, the OECD/DAC Manual deeply envisions the role that international partners are 
likely to play when providing support to SSR processes: international donors are seen as an integral 
part of the multi-layered governance system promoted through SSR.
13 
3.3 National stakeholders 
Different representations of security reform are competing among the Central African Republic’s 
actors. 
First, the CAR’s political actors, namely, the opposition parties and rebel groups as well as 
governmental authorities, do refer to a very traditional conception of security: security reform is 
overall seen as a means of building up a security apparatus (essentially, a militarised one) that can 
guarantee the state’s monopoly of violence, and thus ensure the political continuity and hegemonic 
stability of the ruling actors. The context of war, which has prevailed in the CAR for more than a 
decade, has deepened this tendency. It is extremely important to mention the fact that almost all the 
influential political actors on the CAR political scene today have played a leading role for decades: 
most of them have occupied the highest functions (Former Presidents of the Republic, Ministers of 
Defence, Prime Minister, Chiefs? of Staff) before joining the ranks of different rebel outfits or of the 
opposition. All these political leaders have seen the military as the best instrument to support their 
access to power and for twenty years the successive heads of state have attempted to instrumentalise 
the armed forces in order to ensure their position. Consequently, the sense of security developed by 
political stakeholders in the CAR’s SSR process fundamentally differs from the normative approach 
promoted by the OECD and international actors such as the EU, who do refer to it. 
Beyond government and political circles, it is possible to identify two alternative representations of 
security reform among Central African actors: 
1.  the representation of security reform among security actors themselves: the armed forces as well 
as the police forces and other security services (intelligence services, customs, water/forest 
services) have developed an approach to security reform which is mainly focused on the ways in 
which their working conditions and individual financial and social conditions could improve. The 
most widespread claims among security providers themselves are their systematic demands for the 
payment of back pay; regular access to the so-called PGA (Prime générale d’alimentation – Food 
allowance); free access to medical care; the construction of barracks where their families could be 
accommodated; the supply of new equipment; and access to training. 
2.  the representation of security among the population at large: the civilian population, especially in 
the provinces, has been suffering for years from the abuses committed by the armed forces in total 
impunity or from their inability to cope with new threats (such as the so-called zaraguinas, i.e., the 
road-cutters) they are confronted with on a daily basis. Consequently, the populations’ definition 
of security reform is mainly framed in terms of physical safety, which private actors (vigilante 
groups set up by the villagers themselves) or customary actors (traditional justice providers), are 
seen as the most likely to provide. In the CAR, a large part of the population depends on a variety 
                                                      
12 “ OECD Handbook on Security Systems Reform: Supporting Security and Justice”, p.68. 
13  Idem, pp. 63-86 and Section 8. Niagalé Bagayoko-Penone 
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of traditional and religious conflict resolution mechanisms, other than the formal state systems. 
The EU (as well as the other international stakeholders) increasingly tends to acknowledge the 
existence and the relevance of these systems in some cases. However, these formal systems are 
also legitimising some practices – for instance, the persecution of the alleged “witches” – which 
do not uphold international human rights standards as promoted by the DAC/OECD approach to 
SSR. 
3.4 Assessment resources 
The agenda-setting phase of the SSR process in CAR sheds light on the important role played by 
international experts in the policy-making process. A team made of international (and non-African) 
experts, from a variety of backgrounds (both academics and practitioners) was initially contracted by 
the UNDP
14 to make a comprehensive assessment of the CAR’s security apparatus: each sector (the 
armed forces, the police forces; the justice sector; the intelligence services; management procedures 
and mechanisms; and parliamentarians and civil society resources) have been audited in detail. This 
expertise provided the rationale for the 2008 SSR National Seminar. 
On the other hand, a Preparatory Committee, all Central African nationals, was set up to prepare 
the National SSR. The National Seminar itself formally involved an important number of Central 
African participants (both from governmental and non-governmental circles). However, most of the 
Central African stakeholders involved in the assessment process were, in fact, hardly able to mobilise 
a credible expertise capacity. Seeing the striking lack of national assessment capacities, the 
international partners finally decided to send an international SSR team from the OECD to train all the 
members of the Preparatory Committee. National stakeholders thus have been unable to put forwards 
their own conceptions of security.  
Therefore it is clearly the expertise and analyses of international experts which have largely framed 
the agenda and a two-year timeline of the SSR process. Peter Haas’ definition (1992) of an epistemic 
community as “a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” 
perfectly describes the importance of the external experts in the SSR process in CAR. The approach 
developed by Ruth Hanau Santini (2006)
15 should be extended to integrate into the analysis the 
cognitive influence that experts deployed in Southern partner-countries can have on policy-making. 
3.5 Programmatic resources 
The mobilisation of programmatic resources is meant to identify the priorities, to establish a hierarchy 
between them, and to select appropriate resources and funding mechanisms in order to set up a 
planning programme. These resources have been mobilised by three international actors – the EC, the 
UNDP and France - and have been combined to put SSR on the CAR’s agenda: goals, objectives and 
timelines have been defined in order to fit into the Poverty Reduction Strategy. 
The identity of the EU institutional actors involved in SSR-related programmes in the CAR is to a 
large extent derived from the financial instruments dedicated to external assistance.
16 The support 
                                                      
14  Initially, some of these experts had been contracted by one of the EU Member States, namely, Belgium – eager to resume 
a more active policy in Central Africa after having withdrawn from the African scene following the Rwandan genocide in 
1994. 
15  Ruth Hanau Santini advocates an approach based upon the relationship between French and German foreign policy 
epistemic communities (composed of experts as well as policy-makers) to analyse the CFSP and the elaboration of the 
European Security Strategy. 
16  In 2005, the OECD/DAC has agreed that a number of SSR-related activities (SSR-civilian activities and democratic 
oversight of the military forces) could be funded on development budgets. Accordingly, several thematic and geographic Multi-level Governance and Security: The Security Sector Reform Process in the Central African Republic 
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provided by the EC to the SSR process in the CAR is funded by the Instrument for Stability, the 
Development Co-operation Instrument, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
and the EDF (European Development Fund). In accordance with the guidelines on project cycle 
management,
17 the Directorate General External Relations (DG Relex) and the Directorate General 
External Development (DG Development) have been involved in the programming phase of the SSR-
process in the CAR. Indeed, the framework for EC led-SSR processes is the Country/Regional 
Strategy Paper (CSP or RSP), which sets out the main objectives and sector priorities for co-operation 
for a seven-year term (six years for ACP countries). More specifically, SSR-related programmes are 
included within National or Regional Indicative Programmes (NIP or RIP), which detail specific 
activities and expected results corresponding to the strategy objectives of the CSP/RSP. DG Dev and 
DG Relex have overall responsibility for developing CSPs, in theory, in close collaboration with 
partner countries. Besides this, the EuropeAid office has also been involved in the programmatic 
phase. However, the key EC actor is clearly the EU Delegation in Bangui,
18 which has played a pivotal 
role, both at the political and the technical level, in the programmatic phase of the Central African 
SSR process and has been acting as an interface between the Directorates-General in Brussels and the 
international and national stakeholders in the CAR. In fact, the major guidelines of the EU support to 
the SSR process are based upon the Delegation’s input into DGs Relex and Dev.
19 
The programmatic phase of the SSR process has also been highly shaped by the interactions 
between the EU Delegation and the major bilateral player (namely, France) in the CAR.
20 Since the 
independence of the Oubagui-Chari provinces, France has been the main bilateral funder in the Central 
African Republic and has been deeply involved in the governance of the CAR’s security sector. France 
(Contd.)                                                                   
financial instruments dedicated to external assistance are supporting SSR-related programmes, including the Instrument 
for Stability, the Development Cooperation Instrument, the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, the European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. 
Furthermore, some SSR programmes can be funded under the European Development Fund (FED - which does not come 
under the Community’s general budget but is managed by a special Committee within the Commission). Finally, some 
plans are being considered with the option of funding some SSR activities using the Peace Facility budget. 
17  See Babaud( 2008). 
18  The EU Delegation in CAR is part of the External Service of the European Commission (Directorate General for External 
Relations). However, the Delegation does not only represent the Commission, but the EU as a whole. As such, the 
Delegation is responsible for promoting the EU’s interests and values, and conducts all official relations between the 
CAR and the European Union. This includes presenting, explaining and defending EU policies to the Central African 
Authorities, NGOs, Civil Society and the private sector. In 2003 the EU Delegations’ responsibilities expanded 
considerably as a consequence of the devolution policy adopted by the Commission in 2000. From then on, the 
Delegation covered all aspects - from identification to implementation and evaluation - of the EU external assistance and 
aid programme. This increased responsibility is part of the overall reform of the management of the EC’s external 
assistance programmes, which is aimed at improving the quality, and the speeding up of the implementation of its 
assistance. 
19  This pivotal role of the EU Delegation in the implementation of the EU support to the SSR process in CAR sheds light on 
the major importance – often underestimated – of the EU Delegation in the European foreign and security policy 
decision-making processes. Little has been published about European Commission delegations or their precursors. 
Veronique Dimier’s research (2006; 2003) – dealing with the evolution of the status and role of the delegations of the 
European Commission in Africa from the 1960s onwards and showing that this evolution reflects the bureaucratisation of 
the external service (in the Weberian sense of a rational and professional civil service) in parallel with that of the 
administration of the Commission as a whole – offers an interesting (neo-intuitionalist) approach to grasp the growing 
influence of the EU Delegations in the EU foreign policy-making processes. 
20  It is important to mention that the SSR process in CAR is also shaped by interactions between the different multilateral 
stakeholders. Since 2005, international donors’ co-ordination in partner countries has supposedly meant to be based, 
wherever possible, upon the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness which lauds donors’ co-ordination. 
The UNDP is the major multilateral partner of the EU in the SSR process. Consequently, one of the most important tasks 
of the EU Delegation is to co-ordinate the EC SSR-related programmes with those of the UNDP, in order to clearly 
define roles and responsibilities, and to avoid ambiguity about divisions of labour that could hamper implementation. As 
stated by Liisa Laakso (2005), EU interactions with international organisations (and third states) are not sufficiently 
acknowledged in the multi-level model. Niagalé Bagayoko-Penone 
10 
has signed an official defence agreement with the country. Furthermore, after the 1997 withdrawal of 
its military forces that had previously been permanently stationed in the country, France has 
maintained a contingent of 220 soldiers and, in October 2006, it strengthened this contingent by 
sending supplementary soldiers when a rebel group launched an attack against the government. 
Besides direct military assistance, French servicemen have also been participating in the training of 
Central African servicemen, whilst French technical advisers work on a daily basis within the Central 
African Ministries (Defence, Interior, Customs, Justice, etc). Since 2003, the military co-operation of 
France with the Central African Republic has been characterised by the application of an emergency 
plan for the benefit of the Central African armed forces, which is based upon the re-organisation of the 
Central African armed forces (FACA) and the Gendarmerie. Significant support has also been 
provided to the police forces. When the EC and the UNDP decided to get involved in supporting the 
SSR-process, France proved to be eager to see its own bilateral policy integrated into the process:
21 the 
EU Delegation as well as the UNDP office have had to work closely with the French embassy in the 
CAR to co-ordinate all matters relating to the SSR process. 
3.6 Distribution of power in the policy formulation phase 
Mainly based upon the human security paradigm, the OECD/DAC approach to SSR endorsed by the 
major international partners fundamentally challenges the state-centric and sovereign conception of 
security: it aims to broaden the set of actors involved in the definition and the implementation of 
security policy beyond government circles. Through SSR, donors are fundamentally trying to change 
power relationships in Southern countries by making policy-making processes more inclusive. 
International actors are trying to support a greater involvement of national non-state and non-
governmental actors as well as to promote the role of international ones (in fact, themselves) in the 
governance of the security sector, by promoting more decentralised and pluralistic decision-making 
processes. From this point of view, the OECD approach to SSR is an illustration of governance as 
defined by Marcussen and Torfing (2007):  
“governance implies a decentring of governing away from the state and a pluralisation of actors 
involved in governing” 
SSR is not in essence a move from the state but an attempt at embedding security policy-making in 
wider regulatory and control networks. In summary, security reform as conceived by international 
actors is primarily seen as a way of diffusing liberal norms and values of democracy and human rights. 
However, the representation of security promoted through the SSR concept is not in accordance 
with the representation of security, which is most widespread among the CAR’s political stakeholders, 
be they in the government or not. However, the political actors (including those currently ruling the 
country) have not been able to mobilise assessment and programming resources to promote their own 
conception of security reform, which is primarily seen as a means of re-inforcing the military 
apparatus. Central African actors have not been able to mobilise significant expertise and 
programmatic resources to have a major impact on the formulation phase. The SSR process has 
consequently been almost exclusively framed by international donors, who have favoured the local 
conceptions of security, which were more congruent with the OECD approach (namely, those of the 
security services themselves, and, to a lesser extent, those of the population at large). In summary, it is 
difficult to identify any major influence by the national actors over the policy formulation phase of the 
policy-making process. 
                                                      
21  The integration of French assistance into the SSR process allows France to remain involved in the governance of the 
CAR’s security sector whilst rendering groundless the accusations of paternalism and neo-colonialism. The 
multilateralisation of its bilateral security policy also enables France to rationalise and share the costs of defence and 
security co-operation. Multi-level Governance and Security: The Security Sector Reform Process in the Central African Republic 
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4. Implementing phase: Managing and monitoring 
To assess the distribution of power in this implementing phase, we will focus on three kinds of 
resources which are mobilised: 
•  institutional resources (constitutional, legislative, decentralised); 
•  technical resources; 
•  financial resources; and 
•  monitoring resources. 
4.1 Institutional resources 
4.1.1 Constitutional resources 
The new Constitution of the Central African Republic, adopted by referendum on 5 December 2004, 
was promulgated on 28 December 2004 by President Bozizé. Elaborated upon the basis of the 
previous Constitution of 14 January 1995 (and constantly violated by President Patassé), this new 
fundamental law establishes a semi-presidential regime. The constitutional framework is largely 
inspired by the Fifth French Republic Constitution, which formally favours the concentration of power 
in the hands of the Presidency. According to the Constitutions, the President of the Republic, the 
Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces, is able to define the national defence policy, which is executed 
by the Minister of the Armed Forces, under the aegis of the Prime Minister: as in most Francophone 
African countries, these constitutional provisions have resulted in a situation in which the security 
domain is, to a large extent, the exclusive monopoly of the President, assisted by a limited circle of 
civilian and military advisers. However, such exorbitant prerogatives were apparently not sufficient. 
Since 2003, General Bozizé has concurrently held the roles of President of the Republic and Minister 
of Defence, in violation of Article 23 of the Constitution, which stipulates that the function of the 
President of the Republic is incompatible with the exercise of any other political function. Under 
international pressure, General Bozizé finally decided to create the post of Minister of State of 
Defence, which he conferred on his son. 
4.1.2 Legislative resources 
One of the central objectives of the SSR process is the promotion of the role of Parliament in the 
supervision and oversight of the defence and security institutions. 
In the CAR, the Parliament is unicameral: the National Assembly consists of 105 representatives. 
At present, the Central African National Assembly is dominated by representatives associated with 
President Bozizé. They include: the independent group KNK (a political association created by 
General Bozizé and not yet constituted as a political party), the PDCA, the PNCN, the MDI, the PLD, 
the MDD, the PLD, the MUD, the FODEM and the PUN. The KNK holds 45 seats of the whole 77 
seat majority. The parties of the opposition are the MLPC (Patassé’s party, taken over by Jean-Jacques 
Demafouth), the RDC (Kolingba’s party), the APD (Koyambo’s party), the FPP (the party of the 
historical opponent Abel Goumba, companion of the CAR’s founder Barthélemy Boganda) and some 
other small associations of lesser importance on the political scene. 
According to Article 61 of the Central African Constitution, the National Assembly is empowered 
to exercise parliamentary control over the defence and security forces. Two Parliamentary committees 
are in charge of security matters: the “Defence” Committee, in charge of questions relating to the 
FACA and to the Gendarmerie; the “Home/Law” Committee, in charge of questions relating to the 
internal security forces. These Committees are endowed with the power of inquiry and are supposed to 
control ministerial responsibility through oral or written questions, or can even vote for a censure Niagalé Bagayoko-Penone 
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motion against Ministers; they are also supposed to approve and control the defence and security 
budget and to supervise the interventions of the armed and security forces. 
However, the Parliamentarians do not, in practice, exercise the powers that they are entrusted to by 
the Constitution. In fact, empowering the National Assembly as planned by the SSR process largely 
amounts to re-inforcing the government itself, given that the Central African National Assembly is 
dominated by Parliamentarians belonging to political parties associated with, or affiliated to, the 
President. Consequently, most of the members of the Defence and the Internal Affairs Committees 
belong to parties from the majority group and are very unlikely to launch information missions or to 
adopt legislation that the government does not agree with. It is worth noting as well that it is hard to 
consider the political parties not affiliated to the presidential majority as opposition groups: most of 
the members of these parties have been participating in one way or another in successive governments 
of the current regime. However, the democratic legitimacy of the Central African Parliamentarians 
cannot be denied: indeed, the unquestionably fair legislative elections of May 2005 truly gave the head 
of state a majority in parliament. However, it is also an unquestionable fact that most of the political 
groups in the National Assembly are chaired by close relatives of President Bozizé. 
4.2 Decentralised resources 
The SSR process is also planning to increase the influence of decentralised actors over security 
governance. The objective is to create zones of defence to develop a defence of proximity: these zones 
of defence should coincide with the government of administrative regions and are meant to be 
managed by the prefects of each zone. The idea is to confer to the prefect the responsibility to co-
ordinate the troops deployed in his prefecture. It also planned, on the other hand, to re-inforce the 
municipal police forces and, consequently, the power of the mayors, who are legally responsible for 
overseeing those forces.  
However, these zones of defence, as well as the regions, are empty shells. Indeed, administrative 
regions were created on paper and should be headed by governors.
22 It is Law 88.005 and Order 
88.006 of 5 and 12 February 1988, which determine the administrative organisation of the CAR and 
override Laws 64/32 and 64/33 of 20 November 1964. However, both these 1988 orders have only 
been partially implemented so far. The municipality is a territorial jurisdiction, consisting of villages, 
districts, areas and neighbourhoods, the territorial limits of which are determined by law. According to 
the texts, mayors are elected by the city council, who are themselves elected for 5 years. However, no 
municipal election has ever been organised in the Central African Republic, and, at present, mayors 
are appointed by the central power by decrees or orders. This is why mayors are called “presidents of 
special delegation”. Besides, mayors failing in their duties can be revoked by the President of the 
Republic, in a decree of revocation. Moreover, in spite of the 1988 laws, there were no prefects in the 
country’s provinces until 2003: it was the military governors who managed the problems of 
administration and police. The 1988 law regarding prefects and sub-prefects is now effective. In his 
district, the prefect is the representative of state. 
However, it is doubtful that increasing the responsibilities of decentralised actors as envisioned by 
the SSR process would result in a more balanced management of the security sector. Indeed, 
decentralised actors such as prefects and mayors are appointed by the central government, and these 
positions are also all of the time entrusted to close relatives of the President. 
                                                      
22  Currently, the Central African Republic is divided into 16 prefectures, each placed under the responsibility of a prefect. 
These prefectures are divided into 66 sub-prefectures, then into 175 municipalities. Moreover there are 8,800 villages or 
districts. Multi-level Governance and Security: The Security Sector Reform Process in the Central African Republic 
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4.3 Financial resources 
As one of the poorest countries in the world, the Central African state clearly cannot mobilise the 
financial resources needed to fund a holistic SSR process. In fact, the funding required is almost 
exclusively provided by the international community. Following the 2008 National SSR Seminar, the 
EC decided to focus its support of the SSR process on the following core actions: supporting the 
deployment of an international SSR multidisciplinary team
23 in charge of assisting the Central African 
stakeholders (both in governmental and non-governmental circles) in the implementation of the 
reforms defined in the two-year timeline; funding the 33 months of back-pay of the servicemen (7 
million euros); financing a 10 million euro plan to support justice sector reform; continuing to provide 
financial support to the regional peacekeeping force, MICOPAX, which the Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS) has created. France (on a bilateral basis), and, to a lesser extent, the 
UNDP, are also major funders of the SSR process. 
However, international donors only have partial control over the resources that they provide to fund 
the SSR process. It appears that the CAR’s government is largely able to control the way in which the 
financial resources dedicated to the SSR process are used, particularly those dedicated to the defence 
sector. 
Officially, the defence budget, voted for by the Parliament, amounts to 12-13% of the national 
budget. However, the budget of the armed forces appears as virtual. It is extremely difficult for the 
parliamentarians - just as for oversight bodies (auditor general, inspector general, Ombudsman, Audit 
Account Court) - to obtain information about the realities of the defence budget. Only the President 
and the Deputy Minister of Defence (his own son) know the reality of the available amounts, and, 
apparently, they are the only ones who can decide upon the allocation of funds. Nobody within the 
armed forces, not even the CEMA (Chief of Staff), has access to the budget which is administered 
directly by the Presidency: the CEMA has to send requests monthly to the Deputy Minister of Defence 
to be allowed to engage in any expenditure, from the toners necessary to print documents to the 
funding necessary to buy ammunitions or to organise training. A number of international experts (both 
contracted by multilateral donors and by France) confess that the question of the defence budget 
remains totally misty to them: this question is too sensitive for them to dare to ask questions. 
This situation partly explains why one of the key objectives of the SSR process is to introduce 
transparency and sound principles into the management of the security sector, particularly by 
favouring the development of auditing capacities. However, most of the institutions and procedures 
that international partners are trying to support are, in fact, deprived of any significant influence over 
the budgeting process. For instance, whilst the Audit Account Court is seen by international donors as 
a key independent oversight body, the magistrates from this jurisdiction confess to be more than 
reluctant to control the expenses of the security sector, tacitly considered as an exclusive monopoly of 
the Head of State. Furthermore, the Audit Account Court has not been given any means by 
government or parliament to fulfil its missions: the Court members do not have any cars or computers. 
Similarly, the parliament votes on security budgets as requested by the government without being 
given any information regarding its content. 
In fact, it appears that external funds cannot be sufficiently controlled through the national budget 
system: the audit and control procedures are not functioning and the budgeting process is, in fact, 
largely controlled not by the government as such, but exclusively by the Presidency. 
                                                      
23  The EC is funding 5 experts of the team, namely, the head of the team, the defence sector reform adviser, the police 
sector reform adviser, the public finances expert and the land settlement expert. The UNDP has committed itself to 
funding three experts of the international SSR multi-disciplinary team. Niagalé Bagayoko-Penone 
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4.4 Technical resources 
To supervise the SSR process, the so-called “National Technical Permanent Secretariat”, in charge of 
co-ordinating the implementation of the reform in seven interdependent fields, has been set up. In 
addition, seven “thematic groups”, co-ordinated by a so-called “focal point” identified in each ministry 
involved in the reform, have been put on their feet (defence reform; police reform; financial and 
managerial reform; devolution reform; justice reform; and democratic control and DDR). To show his 
good political will, President Bozizé has been eager to integrate into the Technical Permanent 
Secretariat personalities seen as affiliated to his political rivals, following his policy consisting of 
bringing personalities from other political background than his own into the government. The 
Secretariat has thus been headed by the former chief of staff of President Patassé, assisted by four 
technical assistants, thus guaranteeing that the political opposition is formally associated to the 
process. Moreover, a significant number of the members of the seven thematic groups seem to have 
been hired according to their technical knowledge and competencies. 
The international experts are also important stakeholders in the implementation process: indeed, as 
mentioned above, an international multi-disciplinary SSR advisory team - which includes eight experts 
- has been set up with the support of the EU and the UNDP. These experts - co-ordinated by a head of 
the team who is permanently assisting the National Technical Permanent Secretariat - are assisting 
each of the seven thematic groups on a daily basis. Furthermore, forty or so French “cooperants” are 
still embedded in the Central African administrative services of the Ministries dealing with security 
matters (Defence, Interior, Justice, Finances, etc.). The mandate of these international experts is to 
implement the chronogram adopted after the National SR Seminar. 
However, beyond this formal structure, it is clear that people who do have a real influence over the 
security policy (chief of staff and deputy chief of staff; director-general of the police; state prosecutor; 
director of the customs; director-general of state finances, etc.) are closely related to the President 
himself. Reforms seen as contradictory to their own interests are regularly postponed. In addition, 
even if (contrary to his predecessors), General Bozizé cannot really be accused of leading a systematic 
ethnic policy in the administration, only the Mbayas (from the President’s ethnic group) have 
authority, whilst the Yakoma (from the ethnic group of former-President Kolingba) are marginalised: 
all the highest positions are occupied by those who have the ascendancy of the Mbaya group. 
4.5 Monitoring resources 
The monitoring resources are mobilised to review the progress and achievements and to evaluate the 
impact of the SR process. Monitoring is used as a management tool to adjust assistance programmes to 
the changing context and needs. In the CAR’s SSR process, the monitoring resources are exclusively 
mobilised by international actors. The EU Delegation is responsible, in co-operation with EuropeAid, 
for evaluating and auditing the reform process: to do so, international independent experts are 
contracted on a regular basis to bring an external view on the reforms implemented both by the 
international experts embedded in the CAR’s administration on a permanent basis and by the national 
actors. 
4.6 Distribution of power in the implementation phase 
The implementation phase of the CAR’s SSR process is clearly dominated by the government and 
more precisely by the Presidency, which is proving to be able to control both an important part of the 
financial resources (even if they are almost exclusively provided by international partners) and the 
institutional resources located in non-governmental policy-making circles. Non-governmental 
decision-making circles (especially the parliamentarians and the decentralised actors), who are meant 
to be associated with the governance of the security sector or to control and supervise it, are, in fact, to 
a large extent – if not fully – controlled by the government, which has penetrated most of the other Multi-level Governance and Security: The Security Sector Reform Process in the Central African Republic 
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decision-making centres. So, the local actors with whom the international players are aiming to 
associate fully, the security decision-making process are more often an instrument of the government 
itself. 
Notwithstanding this range of formal mechanisms, it is worth noting that most of the decision-
makers supposed to be involved in SSR process belong to the same ethnic group as the president or are 
closely related to him by kinship relationships. Today, as an ICG (International Crisis Group) report 
succinctly underlines, the real power is monopolised by the President of the Republic and his close 
relatives. General Bozizé, after his election, 
“brought many prominent personalities from other backgrounds than his own into the government. 
However, as analysis of the Bozizé regime reveals, real power was monopolised by the president 
and his close associates, most of whom were members of his immediate family or ethnic group. 
(…) Analysis of the list of names most frequently mentioned in this context by both foreign and 
CAR observers aware of the workings of the regime leads to a triple conclusion: the alveolar 
division of power, the strong personalisation of power and the over-representation of General 
Bozizé’s ethnic group, the Gbaya. We can distinguish several operational circles around President 
Bozizé, all of which are supported by the state’s institutional framework (…). They all depend on 
direct access to the head of state, a source of a power unhampered by rules. This is clearly true for 
his close friends, more distant relatives and also for the regime's political commissars,
 the people 
who silently get the work done and their auxiliaries in key administrative posts or serving as 
brokers at the international level.”
24 
In fact, inter-institutional relationships in the CAR are underpinned by a complex system of processes 
and interfaces of a non-institutional nature. Informal links and structures of power based upon such 
factors as ethnic, family and political connections count as much as the formal institutional 
mechanisms. Put another way, inter-institutional relationships in the CAR’s social context are working 
“via a range of subjective interfaces and partnerships of which the formal mechanisms are either a 
component thereof or are, alternatively, merely the formal expression of these power relations” 
(Williams Rocky, 2005).
25 Governance is networked in the CAR but the informal social solidarity 
networks do not necessarily contribute to the democratic governance of the security sector: the actors 
that the international stakeholders are seeking to mobilise are, in fact, controlled by the government, 
which does not have the same agenda or, at least, the same definition of security as the one underlying 
the SSR concept. 
On the other hand, international stakeholders only have a limited influence – essentially exercised 
via their financial and monitoring resources - on the implementation of the SSR process. 
5. Conclusion 
The case study of SSR process in the Central African Republic shows how decision-making 
competencies are shared amongst a variety of actors, internationally located at different territorial and 
institutional levels. Investigating the kind of power distribution at stake in the SSR process clearly 
suggests that there is a growing dispersion of power in the CAR’s security governance. As stated by 
Yves-Alexandre Chouala,  
“multi-level governance context is characterised by the multiplicity of actors with a different 
nature and unequal resources and positions. It’s therefore a situation marked by divergent 
objectives and interests. In such a context therefore, triumphed objectives and interests are those of 
actors having the advantage of the balance of resources within the security governance field.” 
                                                      
24  International Crisis Group (2008), pp. 18-19. 
25  Only a few researches have investigated the security decision-making processes in Southern countries (Hendrickson, 
Bastian, 2008). Niagalé Bagayoko-Penone 
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New international players have been able to set up new priorities and new conceptions of security. 
However, their influence over the outcomes is, in fact, limited to a large extent to the policy 
formulation phase. The implementation phase, in contrast, is mainly dominated by the Central African 
executive power, which is the only actor able both to mobilise and to control both the local resources 
and, to a lesser extent, some of the international resources. The approach to security sector reform, as 
promoted by multilateral actors such as the EU (and the UNDP), is mainly framed in terms of 
technical questions of co-ordination and political questions of democratic governance. Such an 
approach interferes with the CAR’s proliferating jurisdictions, value systems, and patronage networks, 
which are, in fact, largely dominated by Bozizé’s regime. One of the main problems of the SSR 
concept, itself derived from the OECD approach, is that it is too often based upon theoretical models 
that are drawn from western political science, which are of limited use in understanding how the 
security sector actually works in practice in African states. It is then necessary to take into 
consideration the micro-social dynamics and the diverse forms of organisation and civil control which 
are non- formal-legalistic in nature, and involve other social processes and interfaces. A wide range of 
informal procedures shape decision-making in the CAR, and interfere with the norms and procedures 
that are promoted by external actors. These kinds of informal processes, often rooted in kinship, 
customary and patronage networks, but also in shadow-political networks, co-exist with the state’s 
formal decision-making structures, inspired by the Weberian rationalist organisational model and 
increasingly with the decentralised mechanisms that international actors are attempting to introduce 
via the SSR process. 
The multi-level governance approach is well-equipped to grasp such processes. Indeed, the value 
that is added by a multi-level governance approach is that it goes beyond formal organisational 
arrangements, and formal decision-making mechanisms, recognising complexity far more than 
traditional politico-administrative models do.
26 When complemented with the policy transfer 
approach, it can provide a relevant framework to study the way in which domestic security governance 
in some African countries is reshaped by the interactions of the heterogeneous norms, standards and 
procedures underlying international and domestic decision-making processes, which thus contribute to 
challenge the state-centric definition of sovereign security governance. The question of the state-
centric notion of sovereignty does matter, particularly in the context of a foreign policy aimed at 
reforming a sector that is traditionally at the core of kingly state institutions. Investigating the SSR 
process in the CAR through a multi-level governance approach, thus enables one to draw conclusions 
about the kind of security governance which is emerging in the Central African context. The security 
sector, traditionally seen as the preserve of the sovereign state, is no longer centrally governed, but 
increasingly multi-level governed. However, this situation does not mean that the Central African state 
has lost its prominence in the realm of security. Presently, local or indigenous procedures and 
patronage networks controlled by the state are likely to prevail for technical procedures and inclusive 
governance arrangements promoted by international actors.
27 The actors that can be seen as an 
alternative or rather as a complement to the state are presently not located in the check-and-balance 
institutions inspired by the Western institutional model. Those actors can be seen as belonging to two 
categories: first, the vigilante and self-defence groups (the so-called “local forces” and “archers”) 
established by the villagers in the provinces; secondly, traditional and customary justice institutions. 
However, these actors, even if they meet some expectations of the population, do not always intervene 
with the democratic standards and human rights standards promoted by the SSR concept. 
                                                      
26  This is why the multi-level governance approach is very close to the “network governance approach” which puts the 
stress on informal, loose structures, network ties and belief affinities that extend across, and beyond, hierarchies. 
27  According to Yves-Alexandre Chouala, “Historically and practically, sovereignty has never been absolute and in this 
sense, the Central African Republic has never been a full sovereign State in the security field. But, if one agrees that 
sovereignty is more often conceived as the room for manoeuvre and autonomy that a State conserves in a constraint and 
relational context, the Central African Republic probably remains a sovereign security state”. Multi-level Governance and Security: The Security Sector Reform Process in the Central African Republic 
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To conclude, it is important to note that, while one could object that the multi-level governance 
approach developed here, based upon the identification of the resources mobilised at each stage of the 
policy-making process, is, in fact, reproducing the methods used by international stakeholders to set 
up the SSR process (needs assessment, programming, implementation, monitoring). In fact, these 
methods are far from reflecting the way in which the policy-making process is functioning in a country 
such as the CAR. However, this is objectively the way in which the SSR process has been 
conceptualised and then implemented. Putting the stress on the kinds of resources that all the 
stakeholders, especially the international ones, have mobilised is particularly important in order to 
inform the Central African actors themselves (especially those with no access to policy-making 
circles) about the kinds of procedures and mechanisms which have an impact on their daily-lives. 
From this point of view, the multi-level governance approach also enables a focus on the lack of 
accountability of the international actors involved in the SSR process. If international stakeholders 
want to convince Central African citizens of the relevance of the SSR approach that they are 
promoting, there is a need for greater transparency: as it is crucial for international partners to 
understand the way in which decision-making is functioning in Southern countries, it is also essential 
for the local actors to understand the procedures and decision-making processes with which 
international actors are intervening in their social environment. Niagalé Bagayoko-Penone 
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Appendix: Twofold SSR Co-ordination Structure 
National structure 
Interface between 




Sectorial SSR Committee 
(interagency structure): 
- Chaired by the Deputy Minister of 
Defence, seconded by the Minister of 
Justice;  
- Made of all the Ministers involved in 
the SSR process; 
- Rapporteur from the Ministry for 
Internal Affairs and Public Security; 
- Rapporteur-adjoint (également 
Président du STP); 
- Representatives (1 to 3) from civil 
society (Human rights and women 
associations); 



















International SSR Committee 
- Ambassadors (France, Belgium, etc.) 
and multilateral organisations 
representatives (United Nations via 
the BONUCA; UNDP; European 
Union); 
Secrétariat technique permanent 
(STP) 
- National Co-ordinator, assisted by a 
Deputy; 
- 3 permanent secretaries (in charge of 
transversal issues: gender; legal and 
institutional framework; 
synchronisation of activities), 
working under the supervision of the 
Head of the International permanent 
multi-disciplinary team);  
  Attachés and political counsellors 
in the embassies and multi-lateral 
organisations’ offices (France, EU; 
UNDP; BONUCA) 
7 Thematic groups (defence, police, 
public finances; justice; devolution 
policy; democratic control; DDR) 
coordinated by a national “focal 
point” and assisted by the experts 
of the permanent multi-
disciplinary team 
  Technical co-operants embedded 
in Central African Ministries  
 Multi-level Governance and Security: The Security Sector Reform Process in the Central African Republic 
19 
Bibliography 
Bache Ian (2008), “Researching multi-level governance”, Paper presented to the Governance and 
Sustainability Seminar Series, University of Westminster, January 24th 2008.  
Bache Ian (2008), Europeanization and multi-level governance: Cohesion Policy in the European 
Union and Britain, Rowman and Littlefield. 
Bache Ian and Flinders Matthews (2004), “Multi-level Governance and the Study of the British Sate”, 
Public Policy and Administration, Vol. 19, No. 1.  
Bagayoko Niagalé et Gibert M., (2007), The European Union in Africa: the linkage between Security, 
Governance and Development from an Institutional Perspective, IDS Working Paper number 284, 
May, publication to come in the Journal of Development Studies.  
—— (2004a), ‘Les Politiques Européennes de Prévention et de Gestion des Conflits 
—— (2004b), ‘L’Opération Artémis, un Tournant pour la Politique Européenne de Sécurité et de 
Défense?’, Afrique Contemporaine, volume 209, pp.101–16 
Bagayoko Niagalé, (2008), The Central African Security System: actors and structures, Report to 
DFID, 
Baubaud Sebastien and Kerts Evert (2008), Security Mapping Exercice, Clingandael Institute.  
Benz Arthur and Papadopoulos Yannis (2006), Governance and Democracy: Comparing National, 
European and International Experiences, Abingdon, Routledge.  
Berman Eric G., The Central African Republic: a case study on light weapons and conflicts, the 
Special report of the small arms survey with the support of the PNUD, Institute of the high 
international studies, June, 2006. 
Brothers-in-arms magazine, Special File: Central African Republic, file number 251, 3rd trimestre, 
2006. 
Bukowski Jeanie, “Policy Networks and Multi-level Interactions: Environmental Policy in Spain and 
Portugal”, Presentation for the ESCA 2001 International Conference, Madison, Wisconsin. 
Châtaigner, J.-M., (2004), ‘Aide Publique au Développement et Réformes des Systèmes de Sécurité: 
l’improbable Rencontre du Dr Jekyll et de Mr Hyde’, Afrique Contemporaine, volume 209, pp. 23–
49 
Christensen Th. et al (1999), “The Social Construction of Europe”, Journal of European Public 
Policy, volume 6, number 4, pp. 528-544 
Didier Bigo, Power and obedience in the Central African Republic, Khartala, Paris, 1988, pp. 114-
143. 
Dimier V. and Mc Geever Mike (2006), Diplomats Without a Flag: The Institutionalization of the 
Delegations of the Commission in African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries, Journal of Common 
Market StudiesVolume 44, Issue 3  
Dimier, V., (2003), Institutional Change Within a Multinational Organisation: Life and Death of DG 
DEV (European Commission), 1958–2002, Edinburgh: European Consortium for Political 
Research 
Dolowitz, D. and Marsh, D. “Learning from abroad: the role of policy transfer in contemporary policy 
making”, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 13, no.1, January 
2000: Niagalé Bagayoko-Penone 
20 
Dumoulin A., Mathieu R., et Sarlet G., (2003), La politique européenne de sécurité et de défense 
(PESD): de l’opératoire à l’identitaire, Bruylant, Bruxelles. 
Egeberg, M., (1999), ‘The Impact of Bureaucratic Structure on Policy Making’, Public 
Administration, volume 77, number1, pp. 155–70 
Faria, F., (2004), Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of The  
Glarbo, K., (1999), “Wide-awake Diplomacy: Reconstructing the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy of the European Union”, Journal of European Public Policy, volume 6, pp. 634-651 
Haas Peter, “Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination”, 
International Organization 46, 1, Winter 1992. 
Hanau Santini, Ruth. "The Evolution of CFSP: What has been the Role and Impact of French and 
German Foreign Policy Epistemic Communities?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
International Studies Association, Town & Country Resort and Convention Center, San Diego, 
California, USA, Mar 22, 2006. 
Hendrickson Dylan and Sunil Bastian (2007), State responsiveness to public security needs: the 
politics of security decision-making, a comparative study of Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda”, Draft 
paper. 
Hooghe, L., and Mark, Gary (1999), “The making of a polity: the Struggle ove Euroepan integration”, 
in Kitschelt, Lange, Marks and Stephens (eds), Continuity and Change in Contemporary 
Capitalism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press  
Human Rights Watch, Central African Republic: state of anarchy. Rebels and exactions against the 
civil population, volume 19, number 14, September, 2007.  
International Crisis Group, Central African Republic: anatomy of a ghost State, a report Africa 
number 136, in December 13th, 2007. 
Jachtenfuchs M., (2001), “The Governance Approach to European Integration”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, volume 39, number 2, pp. 245-264 
Jones S., (2007), The Rise of European Security Cooperation, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne  
Krause, A., (2003), ‘The European Union’s Africa Policy: The Commission as Policy Entrepreneur in 
the CFSP’, European Affairs Review 8: 221–37 
Laakso, Liisa. "European Crisis Management Policy: A Capability-Implementation Gap in the 
Making?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton 
Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, Mar 05, 2005. 
Marcussen M.and Torfing J. (2007), Democratic Network Governance in Europe, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave MacMillan. 
Marks G., (1993), “Structural policy and multi-level governance in the EC”, in A.W. Cafruny and 
G.G. Rosenthal, The State of the European Community, volume 2 : The Maastricht Debate and 
Beyond, Boulder, Co. Lynne Rienner  
Marks G., Hooghe L., and Blank K., (1996), “European Integration from the 1980’s : state-centric 
versus multi-level governance”, Journal of Common Market Studies, volume??? number 34, pp. 
342-378 
Nowak, A., (2006), Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way, Chaillot Paper 90, June, Paris: 
European Union Institute for Security Studies: 15–37 
Olsen, G.R., (2002), ‘The EU and Conflict Management in African Emergencies’, International 
Peacekeeping, volume 9, number3, pp 87–102 Multi-level Governance and Security: The Security Sector Reform Process in the Central African Republic 
21 
Peterson J., (2004), Policy networks, in Wiener and Diez, European Integration theory, New York, 
Oxford University Press  
Peterson J., and Bomberg E., (1999), Decision-Making in the European Union, London, Palgrave 
Pollack Mark A., (2005), “Theorizing the European Union: International Organization, Domestic 
Polity or Experiment in New Governance?”, Annual Review of Political Science, number 8, pp. 
357-398 
Rates in the SSR seminar of Bangui (in April 14-17th, 2008), available for consultation on the site of 
the PNUD: www.cf.undp.org/SSR.htm < http: // www.cf.undp.org / SSR.htm 
Refugees International, Central Africa Republic: An Unknown Emergency in a Dangerous Region, 14 
December, 2006.  
Scharpf, (initial?) (1997), Games Real Actors: Actors-Centred Institutionalism in Policy Research, 
Boulder, Co: Westview Press 
Smith M., (2003), The framing of European foreign and security policy: towards a post-modern policy 
framework ?, Journal of European Public Policy, volume 10, number 4, pp. 556-575 
Smith M., (2004), “Toward a theory of EU foreign policy-making: multi-level governance, domestic 
politics and national adaptation to Europe’s common foreign and security policy”, Journal of 
European Public Policy, volume 11, number 4, pp. 740-758 
Stubbs, Paul ,(2005), “Stretching Concepts Too Far? Multi-Level Governance, Policy Transfer and the 
Politics of Scale in South East Europe”, Southeast European Politics, volume VI, No 2  
Williams Rocky (2005), “African armed forces and the challenge of security sector reform”. Journal 





Institute of development Studies (IDS) 
University of Sussex 
BN1 9RE Brighton, UK 
Email: n.bagayoko-penone@ids.ac.uk 
  
 
 